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Nonprofit arts organizations face conflicting objectives to balance—or more specifi-
cally, to create—artistic and educational value and to generate financial income from
various sources. Pay-what-you-want (PWYW), a participative pricing mechanism
where services have no fixed price and customers actively decide what to pay, is a
novel pricing mechanism and is of high interest for organizations and researchers
alike. Based on the concepts of loss aversion and gain, this study presents a field
experiment to test the effects of different PWYW pricing strategies on the amount
of money paid by visitors of a German photo biennial. Explicitly, the provisions of
minimum, maximum, and suggested external reference prices are compared to a set-
ting with no external reference prices. We test the derived hypotheses, discuss the
results, and provide implications for future research, as well as for the management
of nonprofit arts organizations.
K E YWORD S
external reference price, internal reference price, nonprofit arts organizations, pay-what-you-
want, pricing strategy
1 | INTRODUCTION
Nonprofit arts organizations have different and sometimes con-
flicting objectives to balance: in addition to their aim to create
artistic and educational value, nonprofit arts organizations must
generate financial income by attracting public or private funding in
terms of grants, donations, entrance fees, or the like. Since Baumol
and Bowen (1965) first analyzed the economics of performing arts
organizations, the financial dilemmas of and implications for arts
organizations such as museums, theaters, and orchestras have
been a constant subject to research in the nonprofit management
discipline (e.g., Frey & Steiner, 2012; Lindqvist, 2012; Rentschler,
Hede, & White, 2007). Hereby, various pricing schemes with the
aim of relaxing nonprofit arts organizations' financial constraints are
discussed, with fixed entry fees or free entry with exit donations
being the classical models (Frey & Steiner, 2012). However, a rela-
tively new participatory pricing mechanism—pay-what-you-want
(PWYW)—remains under researched in the context of nonprofit art
organizations.
PWYW is a popular pricing method and study object in marketing
and management research (Gerpott, 2017). It is a pricing mechanism
where the seller does not rely on a fixed price but rather the cus-
tomers actively decide what price they find appropriate and want to
pay. In doing so, “the buyer can set any price above or equal to zero,
and the seller cannot reject it” (Kim, Natter, & Spann, 2009, p. 44).
PWYW is supposed to have multiple positive implications, including
an improved awareness of the offerings and the overall image of the
seller, which, in turn, translates into increased sales volume and/or
higher average unit prices (Kim, Natter, & Spann, 2010; Riener &
Traxler, 2012).
So far, PWYW has been researched to a vast extent in various
product and service categories in the for-profit world, such as restau-
rants and bars, amusement parks, online media, concerts, cinema, or
hotel overnight stays (Kim et al., 2009). Based on this rich body of
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research, Gerpott (2017) identifies antecedents that influence cus-
tomer perceptions of PWYW and, consequently, their buying behavior
in a literature review. According to the derived conceptual framework,
factors influencing the success of PWYW are the characteristics of
the buyer (e.g., sociodemographic), the seller (e.g., its size or reputa-
tion), the sales object (e.g., typical level of fixed prices), and the market
context (e.g., competition and transparency). In addition, customers'
perceptions of the PWYW scheme (e.g., perceived fairness of the
PWYW scheme) and elements of the procedural design of the PWYW
setting, such as information given at the point of payment, are related
to PWYW success. Providing external reference prices is such infor-
mation that affects consumers' chosen prices in PWYW pricing.
In PWYW, external reference prices are price suggestions stated
by the seller which fulfill the function of a normative anchor for the
customer's payment decision (Kim, Kaufmann, & Stegemann, 2014).
With respect to external reference prices, different pricing strategies
such as minimum, maximum, and suggested price exist. Research in
for-profit settings reveals inconclusive results on external reference
prices (see Table 1 for an exemplary list of studied pricing strategies).
Some literature studies suggest an increase in prices paid when exter-
nal pricing strategies are used (Armstrong Soule & Madrigal, 2015;
Kim et al., 2009; Regner, 2015), for example, the experiments by Arm-
strong Soule and Madrigal (2015) show that the presence of numbers
in the exchange context influences the amount of voluntary payment.
Others find no effects of external reference prices (Gneezy, Gneezy,
Riener, & Nelson, 2012; Jung, Perfecto, & Nelson, 2016). In contrast,
negative results are also reported (e.g., Johnson & Cui, 2013; Roy,
Rabbanee, & Sharma, 2016). Based on an elaborate theoretical frame-
work, laboratory experiments by Johnson and Cui (2013) indicate that
using an external reference price is not advisable and that setting no
reference price is the most beneficial strategy for companies to yield
the highest return.
Gerpott (2017) concludes that the results on external reference
prices in a PWYW setting are ambiguous, and there is a need for
theory-grounded empirical PWYW studies. In particular, Johnson and
Cui (2013) call for studies to investigate detected biasing effects cau-
sed by external reference prices in a nonprofit PWYW setting. This
call links to the peculiarities of buying and paying behavior within a
TABLE 1 Pricing strategies as frequent subject of research in the for-profit context
Author
For-profit product or
service Pricing strategy Main results
Armstrong Soule
and
Madrigal (2015)
Concert tickets PWYW+ERP: Suggested
price
Higher ERP and information on what others paid (descriptive
norm), not what should be paid (injunctive norm), lead to
higher payment reporting.
Gautier and van der
Klaauw (2012)
Hotel stay PWYW+ERP: Posted
regular price
Participants not knowing about the PWYW scheme beforehand
were influenced by ERP and paid more than hotel guest who
knew about PWYW.
Gneezy
et al. (2012)
Amusement park:
Photo during ride,
tour boat: Photo
during cruise,
restaurant
Fixed price, PWYW:
None, charity share
Consumers are more likely to buy products when given a fixed
and low price compared to PWYW pricing. Charity-shares
with PWYW increase purchase but reduce number of sold
products as customers avoid bad feelings for payments below
an appropriate price.
Johnson and
Cui (2013)
Concert tickets PWYW +ERP: Minimum
price, maximum price,
suggested price and
none
ERP function as anchors in buying decisions with minimum and
maximum have a negative and suggested price have a
positive effect on paid price. Providing no ERP is seen as
overall most beneficial pricing strategy.
Jung et al. (2016) Online media
retailing,
doughnuts, Vodo
PWYW+ERP: Suggested
price, previous
payment, maximum
price
Low ERP leads to socially acceptable low payments, high ERP
has little effect, with the distributional gap of the anchor and
the payment to be one of the main drivers.
Kim, Natter, and
Spann (2014)
Razors, photo
portraits
Free sampling, price
discount, PWYW+ERP:
None
ERP leads to higher prices paid compared to no ERP and
PWYW is suitable for low and medium value products.
Kim et al. (2009) Restaurant, cinema,
delicatessen
PWYW+ERP: None,
posted regular price
In PWYW setting, prices paid significantly differ from zero.
Regner (2015) Online music PWYW+ERP: Price range Customers pay more than the suggested price within a given
price range.
Roy et al. (2016) Fitness gym PWYW+ERP: Posted
regular price
In private context, under intrinsic motivation to purchase, the
prices paid ratio is closer to internal reference price, similarly
when extrinsic or altruistic motives co-occur with a public
payment situation. Without ERP these effects are stronger.
Note: See Gerpott (2017) for a comprehensive overview.
Abbreviations: ERP, External reference prices; PWYW, pay-what-you-want.
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nonprofit context, as pull and push effects seem to work differently.
In a fixed price setting, when faced with the choice to buy products
from for-profit or nonprofit organizations, customers tend to favor
the products from profit-oriented organizations as they assume for-
profits to be more competent at providing higher quality products
(Aaker, Vohs, & Mogilner, 2010). However, in a PWYW setting, this
decision rationale may shift, as customers pay higher amounts to orga-
nizations when prosocial goals are involved (Gneezy et al., 2012). So
far, the charitable aspects within PWYW are analyzed in contexts
where the purchase of a product is combined with an additional pro-
rata donation to charity (Gneezy, Gneezy, Nelson, & Brown, 2010).
Therefore, it is a research imperative to analyze whether different
push and pull effects by variations of external reference prices found
in the for-profit sector hold true in a nonprofit PWYW context.
Furthermore, as knowledge of pricing mechanisms in nonprofit
art organizations can optimize their “organizational outcomes […]
while continuing to meet their social responsibilities” (Rentschler
et al., 2007, p. 163), it is important for these organizations to under-
stand the underlying mechanisms of customers' willingness to pay in
PWYW settings. Burton, Louviere, and Young (2009) argue that
understanding characteristics of customer choice and levels of pricing
is an essential element in marketing strategies for nonprofit arts orga-
nizations active in a competitive leisure marketplace. Consequently,
this study asks how different pricing strategies, namely, minimum and
maximum price, suggested price or no external reference price, influ-
ence the amount voluntarily paid in an arts nonprofit PWYW setting.
To answer this research question, we conduct a field experiment dur-
ing a photo biennial in a medium-sized city in Germany.
Our contribution to research is twofold. As one of the first studies
on PWYW in the nonprofit sector, we generate new insights into the
potential of PWYW as a voluntary pricing mechanism for nonprofit
arts organizations. Additionally, the optimal external reference price
strategy in this setting is identified and valuable implications for non-
profit arts organizations' managers are formulated. Second, with this
study, we aim at overcoming a methodological drawback of recent
PWYW research. So far, most research has evaluated PWYW in stu-
dent samples and in fictitious purchase scenarios, in which only
claimed intentions to pay are measured (Gerpott, 2017). The majority
of existing studies analyze just one specific buyer group, which makes
deriving valid and general conclusions highly controversial. Further-
more, relying on hypothetical prices and intentions to pay bares the
risk of overestimating the corresponding amounts in the case of real
transactions (Gerpott, 2017; Jung et al., 2016; Kim, Kaufmann, &
Stegemann, 2014). Field experiments have a strong external validity,
as they allow for context-specific, real-world data generation and
causal inference (Gerber & Green, 2012). In addition, field experi-
ments allow for evaluating theory in a real context and permit info-
rming an organization's practices and policies (Moseley et al., 2018).
The proceeding of our study is as follows. We first present our
theoretical background and hypotheses based on Johnson and
Cui's (2013) theoretical framework. We then present the experimental
setting using quantitative data collected via a survey of visitors to a
nonprofit biennial photo festival in Germany followed by the
hypotheses testing. Finally, we discuss the results and derive manage-
rial implications and fields for future research.
2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
PWYW is one “participative” price-setting approach that has attracted
considerable attention in research and in practice. PWYW does not
rely on any fixed price but, rather, leaves the price setting completely
to the customer and allows for additional price differentiation and
individualization (Gerpott, 2017). The seller agrees to accept any price
set by the buyer, which, therefore, can vary between zero and—theo-
retically—infinity. Gerpott (2017) distinguishes PWYW from other vol-
untary payments, for example, tipping, donations, gift giving, and
trust-based billing methods. PWYW is applied in direct exchange for a
product or service and is not paid for any ancillary service, charitable
reasons, or in situations where the seller cannot control, whether the
buyer pays the posted price, for example, honesty-based payments
for flowers on a field. PWYW is used in many contexts, especially cul-
tural organizations and street artists have used this pricing mechanism
for a long time (Gerpott, 2017). In contrast to the theory of the eco-
nomic man, the outcome of PWYW is not zero (Kim et al., 2009).
Social, psychological, or moral transaction costs lead to a generation
of income for the organizations applying PWYW. In addition to the
monetary income, other beneficial effects, such as an increasing
awareness or better image, are also attributed to PWYW, which, in
turn, potentially lead to higher sales volume or higher prices than in
conventional fixed prices settings (Riener & Traxler, 2012).
Based on this potential, a large body of scientific literature on
PWYW exists. Gerpott (2017) develops a conceptual framework with
relevant categories and dimensions for PWYW. Drivers of PWYW
effects are market dynamics, such as competition and transparency,
the selling organization, for example, its size or reputation, and the
product or service (Kim, Kaufmann, & Stegemann, 2014; Krämer,
Schmidt, Spann, & Stich, 2017). In addition, characteristics of the cus-
tomer, such as sociodemographic characteristics, or past payments for
similar products or services, known as internal reference prices, guide
payment decisions (Gautier & van der Klaauw, 2012; Roy et al., 2016).
Furthermore, the design of the payment procedure determines the
economic success of PWYW, such as the payment timing, anonymity
of the buyer, or textual cues at the point of payment (Gneezy et al.,
2012; Regner, 2015). Another important part of the procedural design
is the reference price. Prior research provides insights into external
and internal reference prices influencing buyers' willingness to pay
(Mazumdar, Raj, & Sinha, 2005).
An internal reference price is defined as “a memory-resident price
based on actual, fair, or other price concepts” (Roy et al., 2016,
p. 818). Internal reference prices can be found within the buyer as an
internal judgment scale to evaluate offered prices (Mazumdar et al.,
2005; Winer, 1986). These internal prices can be the recalling of
observed or paid prices for similar goods in the past (Gerpott, 2017).
In a PWYW setting, consumers use the internal reference price as a
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memory-based cue that helps them to decide which price they are
willing to pay (Kim et al., 2009). Consequently, internal reference
prices are an important and individual buyer characteristic, which can-
not be influenced by the provider directly. Nevertheless,
Chandrashekaran and Grewal (2006) argue that sometimes buyers
adjust their internal reference prices to be closer to an externally pro-
vided anchor price.
These so-called external reference prices are stimuli or informa-
tion provided by the seller in the purchase environment when offering
a product or service (Roy et al., 2016). These can be fixed prices on
display and any additional information presented by the seller. This
information can make an offering seem more appealing or evoke the
impression of a discounted price (Johnson & Cui, 2013). Conse-
quently, in a regular buying situation, consumers use external refer-
ence prices along with their internal reference prices to first make
their purchasing decisions (Roy et al., 2016), second, find an opportu-
nity to make a surplus (Alford & Biswas, 2002), and third, adjust their
willingness to pay (Mazumdar et al., 2005). In a PWYW setting, no
fixed prices are given; therefore, sellers use other external reference
pricing strategies to communicate their price expectations to the
buyer (Narwal & Nayak, 2019).
Four variants of external reference price strategies are known in
the literature: the minimum price set by the seller, which buyers
should not underbid (Thomas & Gierl, 2014); a maximum price, which
buyers should not overbid (Jung et al., 2016; Regner, 2015); and the
provision of a small number of predetermined prices, from which the
buyers can choose the price level they want to pay (Lynn, 1990). In
addition to binding external prices, the sellers can also use “various
types of less restrictive price nominations” (Gerpott, 2017, p. 41)
stated in recommendations such as “we suggest you pay h…i.” Ger-
pott (2017) criticizes that providing external references can be reg-
arded as an illegitimate attempt by the sellers to influence buyers'
payments against the PWYW agreement to accept any given price.
Moreover, buyers might perceive external reference prices as an
undesired limitation of their freedom in naming their own prices. Nev-
ertheless, these four pricing strategies are the most commonly applied
in a PWYW context.
Research provides evidence that such suggested prices function
as anchor points reducing customers' uncertainty “with respect to an
‘appropriate’ or ‘fair’ price, because buyers can use them to calibrate
their PWYW price setting decisions” (Gerpott, 2017, p. 41). The
majority of empirical studies show that PWYW offers with external
reference prices evoke higher prices paid in comparison to offers
without price suggestions. Moreover, higher levels of external refer-
ence prices should result in higher amounts of payments (see
Gerpott, 2017 for an overview). However, zero or insignificant rela-
tionships between external reference prices and the amount paid
are also detected (Gautier & van der Klaauw, 2012; Gneezy et al.,
2012; Jung et al., 2016). Furthermore, studies show a negative
effect between the external reference prices and the amount paid
(Johnson & Cui, 2013; Jung et al., 2016; Kunter, 2015; Roy et al.,
2016; Thomas & Gierl, 2014). In sum, research on the relationship
between reference prices and the amount paid has produced
ambiguous findings so far. Jung et al. (2016) as well as Ger-
pott (2017) argue that the existing mixed findings are due to meth-
odological problems. Studies reporting significantly positive effects
of external reference prices often rely only on hypothetical pay-
ments of students. These effects cannot be detected in field studies
using real purchasing settings.
In addition to the recent research results and their methodological
issues, theoretical considerations help to disentangle possible working
mechanisms at play in PWYW price setting. As a starting point, there
is the interplay between internal and external reference prices, which
influences the amount paid by buyers. This interplay unleashes a moti-
vational force on buyers by social exchange norms and economic
gains. In situations with no fixed price buyers rely on their internal ref-
erence prices when making funding decisions. At the same time, they
are afraid of social disapproval or sanctions when paying too little
(Gneezy et al., 2012) or zero (Kim et al., 2009) by being perceived as
poor or cheap (Lynn, 1990). For buyers, external reference prices indi-
cate a socially desirable price. Thus, buyers use these external refer-
ence prices as anchors in their price decisions. By doing so, the
anchors shift the actually paid price away from the internal reference
price and toward the socially accepted external reference price (Roy
et al., 2016). In addition, buyers base their payment decisions on per-
ceived economic outcomes, which can be described with the concept
of loss aversion as part of the prospect theory (Kahnemann &
Tversky, 1979). First, consumers value prices in comparison to their
internal point of reference or reference price. Second, whenever
they perceive a price as being above their reference point, they con-
sider it a “loss.” Vice versa, a price below the reference point is con-
sidered a “gain.” A gain increases consumers' surplus or savings over
the amount they initially expected to pay. However, consumers
weigh losses more heavily than equivalent-sized gains and show a
greater desire to avoid losses (e.g., Hardie, Johnson, & Fader, 1993;
Thaler, Tversky, Kahnemann, & Schwartz, 1997; Tversky &
Kahnemann, 1991). Based on this assumption, in PWYW external
reference prices that are perceived as losses influence buyers more
strongly than perceived gains (Bearden, Carlson, & Hardesty, 2003).
Consequently, in a PWYW setting, buyers have a higher interest in
underpaying than overpaying, hence gaining instead of losing
(Johnson & Cui, 2013).
So far, the loss and gain considerations in PWYW relate to typical
commercial consumption situations. In a nonprofit PWYW setting,
there might be additional mechanisms, such as altruism, self-image
effects, and fairness perceptions, that evoke pro-social behavior and
higher prices paid. Recent findings indicate that altruism and loyalty
are no relevant mechanisms explaining payment decisions in PWYW
across industries (Drevs, 2013; Kim et al., 2009). Instead, self-signaling
effects can be linked to pro-social behavior (Gneezy et al., 2010;
Gneezy et al., 2012). In a PWYW experiment, people paid five times
more for a photograph that comes with a donation to a charity than
other people who could only buy a photograph. Although the product
in combination with the contribution to a good cause resulted in
higher payments, only half as many people decided to buy the photo-
graph. According to Gneezy et al. (2010), people prefer to forgo
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buying than paying too little to avoid appearing “cheap” and harming
their own pro-social self-image. However, no implication can be
drawn from these findings directly on how people will decide on their
payment for a product or service from a nonprofit organization in a
PWYW setting.
We assume that in nonprofit PWYW situations, motives typically
associated with nonprofit organizations, such as altruism, are second-
ary as the purchase itself is already a contribution to the organiza-
tion's mission. This argument is supported by Regner's (2015) findings
on motives and pro-social behavior of online music store customers in
a PWYW setting. In Regner's (2015) study, customers claim in a sur-
vey that fairness and support of the artist are reasons for their pay-
ment above the suggested price. However, results from the
experiment reveal reciprocity as the main driver for music customers'
generosity. Guilt and a “warm glow of giving” have low explanatory
value, fairness, and self-image none. Reciprocity is a pivotal mecha-
nism of gift exchange, where individuals are motivated by general and
relative monetary payoffs (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). Transferring
this rationale to the context of PWYW in nonprofit arts organizations,
customers engage in a reciprocal exchange with the nonprofit organi-
zation by visiting the museum or exhibition in the first place. In this
case, customers pay a certain amount of money in exchange for the
organization's services. At the same time, the arts organization
receives monetary compensation as well as an audience, one prereq-
uisite for an arts organization to act on its mission. These consider-
ations above allow us to model different effects of external reference
prices in PWYW for nonprofit organizations in line with the general
economic rationale of loss and gain considerations in payment
decisions.
Independent from the operating sector, we expect the average
impact on buyers' prices paid to depend on whether the external ref-
erence price exerts an upward or a downward pressure on buyers.
The directions of executed pressure are provoked by the interplay
between internal and external references in a PWYW setting
(Johnson & Cui, 2013). When an external reference price exceeds the
internal reference price, an upward pressure increases the buyers'
paid price and vice versa. Thus, pressure varies according to the
sellers' external reference price strategy.
In particular, two effects are likely to occur with an external
minimum price strategy set by the seller: most likely, the minimum
price is below the internal reference price of the buyers and thus
exerts a downward pressure for most buyers, consequently leading
them to lower their paid prices closer to the minimum (Jung et al.,
2016; Kim et al., 2009). If for the minority of buyers, the minimum
price exceeds the internal reference price, then the minimum price
exerts an upward pressure, forcing them to adjust their paid prices
closer to the listed minimum price (Johnson & Cui, 2013). Although
an external minimum price aims at obviating low paid prices, it is a
possibility to perceive a gain for those buyers whose internal refer-
ence price is above the external minimum price (Kahnemann &
Tversky, 1979). Therefore, in this situation, the average paid price is
lowered relative to a setting with an absent external reference price.
Thus, we hypothesize:
H1 In a real purchasing setting, external reference pricing in the form of
a minimum price: (a) decreases the mean paid price and
(b) changes the distribution of the paid prices, causing the paid
prices to cluster closer to the minimum price.
Both effects occur in reverse for maximum price strategies. A
maximum price creates upward pressure for most buyers with lower
internal reference prices and a downward pressure for the minority of
buyers with greater internal reference prices (Mazumdar et al., 2005;
Roy et al., 2016). However, since the experienced upward pressure
for buyers whose internal reference prices are below the external
maximum price is perceived as a loss, it will have a weaker impact on
buyers' paid prices, leading to lower payments (Bearden et al., 2003;
Jung et al., 2016). Additionally, an external maximum price cuts off
the high end of the distribution of paid prices and increases the likeli-
hood of a negative net effect on the average prices paid in compari-
son to using no reference price at all (Johnson & Cui, 2013). Based on
this argumentation, we hypothesize:
H2 In a real purchasing setting, external reference pricing in the form of
a maximum price: (a) decreases the mean paid price and
(b) changes the distribution of the paid prices, causing the paid
prices to cluster closer to the maximum price.
In an external reference price setting with a suggested price
strategy, the suggested price also works as an anchor for the buyer.
For all buyers with lower internal reference prices than the suggested
external reference price, the suggested price exerts an upward pres-
sure, and for all buyers with greater internal reference prices than the
suggested external reference price, the suggested price creates a
downward pressure effect (Gneezy et al., 2012). On average, the
effect varies, depending on whether the majority of buyers have an
internal reference price below or above the suggested price
(Johnson & Cui, 2013). Nevertheless, the suggested price influences
the distribution of paid prices, clustering them closer to the suggested
price and reducing their variance. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H3 In a real purchasing setting, external reference pricing in the form of
a suggested price changes the distribution of the chosen prices,
causing the chosen prices to cluster closer to the suggested price.
Figure 1 shows the postulated effects.
3 | METHODOLOGY
To study the effects of different pricing strategies, we cooperate with
a photo biennial in Germany run by a nonprofit organization that
introduced PWYW as a novel pricing system. To make payment deci-
sions, a minimum level of certainty about the product or service is
necessary. Services such as performing arts shows or museum exhibi-
tions are ambiguous by nature and individuals subjectively perceive
their value (Hume, Sullivan Mort, Liesch, & Winzar, 2006). In such
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environments, where consumers lack certainty about an appropriate
payment for products or services, sellers can provide external refer-
ence prices. These function as a compass to enhance a customer's
level of certainty. Thus, according to the literature, the anchoring
effects of external reference prices are more easily identifiable in situ-
ations of high uncertainty (Jung et al., 2016). Therefore, this particular
setting allows for uncertainty in two ways. First, the value of art, espe-
cially photography, and art exhibitions is ambiguous by nature, and its
perception highly subjective (Hume et al., 2006). Second, the biennial
frequency of the festival, which in that particular year was also
rebranded, allows for little value comparison with past editions of the
festival.
The festival took place in seven different exhibition venues and
attracted over 41,000 visitors during a two-month time period in
2018. At each exhibition venue, information point poles were situated
at the entrance and functioned as post-visit payment and survey sta-
tions. In one of the exhibition venues, we conducted our experiment.
We chose a between-subjects 1 × 4-level posttest-only control group
design with four different conditions of external reference prices
within the PWYW setting: minimum price, maximum price, suggested
price, and no external reference price (control group). To determine
the minimum and maximum prices of the manipulation, we ran a pre-
study in the first 2 weeks of the photo festival in this particular venue
similar to Johnson and Cui (2013). We asked visitors in a survey, the
amount of money they paid for their visit. From that information, we
derived the minimum and maximum values.
For the execution of the experiment, we manipulated the external
reference price information printed on the information point pole
inside the exhibition venue. Since the experiment includes three treat-
ments and one control treatment, we ran each treatment for 1 week
(Tuesdays until Sundays; Mondays the exhibition was closed). External
reference prices were manipulated twofold: first, at the station where
the visitors of the exhibition paid after their visit. For the minimum
price, the call to action was labeled “Contribute what feels right! At
least 4 euros.” For the maximum treatment “At least 4 euros” was rep-
laced with “Maximum 15 euros,” and “Suggestion 7 euros” for the
suggested external reference. Seven euros is chosen because it is the
fixed entry fee for that particular museum venue where the field
experiment took place. During the time of no reference price—our
control group—the slogan was on display with no price suggestions.
Second, within the visitor survey, an item referring to the perceived
appropriateness of each of the reference prices, or none at all (for sce-
nario 4), was included.
During the four-week period of the experiment, data on the num-
ber of visitors and the total amount of money paid were collected.
Considering Gerpott's (2017) critique on minimum and maximum pric-
ing strategies as a violation of the PWYW agreement, in each treat-
ment of the experiment, visitors were not restricted in the individual
price paid and were not sanctioned if they gave less than the mini-
mum or more than the maximum price. Additionally, surveys were dis-
tributed to visitors at the end of the visit after they had passed the
information and payment point pole. In the questionnaire, visitors
were asked: how much money they paid for their visit (Kim et al.,
2009) and their internal reference price, measured as single item
question; and how much money they paid for their latest visit to a
similar cultural activity (Bearden, Kaicker, Smith de Borrero, & Urbany,
1992). Additionally, general questions on participants' age, gender,
education, and income are included as control variables (Coleman,
1983; Kim et al., 2009).
A total of 132 out of 2015 visitors participated in the survey
(6.55% response rate). We checked the data for outliers and excluded
two cases that named 108 euros as payment for the visit, which refers
to the amount paid for a year-long valid museums pass. Of the
130 valid responses, 60 (45.5%) visitors are female. The majority
(24.2%) is between 50 and 59 years old, followed by 18.9% who are
40–49 years old. Furthermore, 56.1% have a university degree, and
50.8% are employed; 11.3% are students, and 9.1% are retired. Con-
sidering earnings, 29.6% earn more than 2,000 € each month. Further-
more, the yearly spending on cultural activities varies from 8.3% of
visitors who spend less than 50 euros, 60.6% who spend between
51 and 500 euros, and 15.9% who spend between 501 and 1,000
euros per year. Descriptive information of the average amount paid,
as well as the internal reference price and control variables, is given in
Table 2. As the analysis shows, no significant differences occur
between gender and income above 2,000 euros among the experi-
mental groups; the randomly assigned treatment groups are suffi-
ciently homogeneous.
4 | RESULTS
We run a one-way ANOVA on the amount paid for the visit. The
results show a significant main effect of the different reference prices
(F[3.126] = 5.970, p = .001, partial ɳ2 = .124). The corrected R-squared
indicated that 10.4% of the mean's variance of the price paid can be
explained with this main effect. The significance of the mean value
differences has a medium effect (.341) (Cohen, 1988), which is calcu-
lated as the square root of the partial ɳ2 divided by 1—the partial ɳ2.
A comparison of the means of the prices paid in the treatments to the
means of the control group (Table 2) shows that providing an external
F IGURE 1 Anchoring effects
interplay between external and internal
reference prices driven by economic gain
and loss aversion
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reference price has a negative effect on the price paid in the
suggested price scenario and a positive effect in the minimum and
maximum price treatments.
To investigate if the differences regarding the mean price paid are
significant, we run a two-sided Dunnett's post hoc test. The results
reveal that only the mean paid price in the maximum price group
(MD = 3.539, p = .002) is significantly higher than the mean chosen
price in the control condition (Table 3). Neither H1a nor H2a can be
supported, with H2a showing significant effects in the opposite direc-
tion as postulated.
Next, the effect of the different pricing strategies on the shape of
the distribution of the money paid is analyzed regarding hypothesis
1b, 2b, and 3 (Figure 2). Looking at the standard deviations of the
prices paid for the control group (No Reference Price) (M = 4.41 €,
SD = 4.38), minimum price (M = 5.60 €, SD = 4.29), maximum price
(M = 7.95 €, SD = 4.42), and suggested price (M = 3.97 €, SD = 3.64),
the latter has the lowest value. The other treatments and the control
group rarely differ in the standard deviation of the paid amount. This
finding indicates that the suggested price reduces variance in the cho-
sen prices.
To statistically assess the distributions of prices paid, the non-
parametric method Kruskal–Wallis test analyzes the variance among
the four groups by ranks. The results suggest that prices paid are not
the same across categories of the experiment, and we can assume dif-
ferences between the tendencies of the groups (Chi-squared
[3] = 15.289, p = .002). As a post hoc test, the Dunn–Bonferroni test
provides insights into significant differences for each group through
pairwise comparison. The results indicate that the suggested price and
maximum price groups differ significantly, with z = − 3.452, p = .003,
as do the no reference price and maximum price groups, with
z = 3.312, p = .006. The effects for both differences are medium
(Cohen, 1992), with correlation coefficient values, r = .425, for the for-
mer and, r = .408, for the latter.1 For the other pairwise comparison,
no significant effects were found (Table 4). A comparison of the SD
for the two significant pairs in Table 2 shows that using the maximum
price slightly increases the variance of prices paid in contrast to using
no reference price or a suggested price.
Next, the absolute distance between the paid prices and external
reference prices is examined for clustering patterns. The absolute dis-
tance measures are calculated using Euclidean distance for each treat-
ment group between the external reference price and the paid prices.
Since the control group has no external reference price, we calculated
absolute distance measures for each external reference price and the
paid price. The independent sample Levene test shows that the maxi-
mum price strategy significantly decreases the paid price distance and
the maximum price distance (p = .000). The other external reference
price strategies show no significant effect on the distances between
the paid prices' and the treatment's distances (Table 5). Hypothesis 2b
is supported, whereas hypothesis 1b and hypothesis 3 are rejected.
Table 6 summarizes the results of the tested hypotheses.
To assess the interplay between the internal and external refer-
ence prices underlying our hypotheses, we investigate the effect of
the internal reference price (IRP) on the actual prices paid. We define
internal reference prices in two ways. In model 1, the average price
paid in the control group, henceforth IRP1 (4.41 euros, Table 2), func-
tions as proxy for an internal reference price (Johnson & Cui, 2013). In
model 2, the self-reported average price paid for a previous visit for a
similar cultural activity in the control group is calculated (9.90 euros,
Table 2) as the internal reference price proxy, named IRP2 (Bearden
et al., 1992). In addition, absolute distance measures were calculated
for each treatment group: in model 1, between price paid and IRP1;
and in model 2, between price paid and IRP2. In a paired sample t-test,
these distance measures are compared with the distance measures
used above in Table 5. Figure 3 illustrates this procedure exemplarily
for the maximum price setting in model 1.
In model 1 (Table 7), the mean distance of the maximum price dif-
fers significantly from that of the internal reference price (p < .10)
with a medium effect of .337. As the distance to the IRP1 of 4.37 is
shorter than to the maximum price, visitors in the setting with the
maximum price strategy pay prices closer to the internal reference
price. For the other treatment groups, no significant effects between
the different distance measures occur.
Analyzing model 2 with the self-reported internal reference prices
reveals different results. In the minimum and suggested price settings,
prices paid cluster closer to the external instead of to the internal ref-
erence price (t = 1.905, p = .066 and t = 6.487, p = .000) with medium
and strong effects. In both cases, the mean distance is smaller for paid
prices and the external price than for the internal reference price. In
contrast to the maximum price treatment group, the effect of IRP2 is
similar to model 1 with significant distance differences of prices clus-
tering closer to the internal reference price (t = −4.623, p = .000)
(Table 8).
TABLE 2 Baseline characteristics of sample
Price paid Internal reference price Gender (female) Income (>2.000 €)
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max % %
Minimum price 4 € (N) 5.60 (31) 4.29 0 20 12.5 (16) 10.08 0 40 41.9 (28) 32.3 (10)
Maximum price 15 € (N) 7.95 (33) 4.42 0 15 9.90 (29) 5.96 0 28 45.5 (32) 33.4 (11)
Suggested price 7 € (N) 3.97 (33) 3.64 0 10 8.05 (21) 5.01 0 15 45.5 (28) 24.3 (8)
No reference price (N) 4.41 (33) 4.38 0 20 9.90 (19) 6.72 0 25 51.7 (29) 30.4 (10)
All (N) 5.48 (130) 4.43 0 20 9.93 (85) 6.91 0 40 45.5 (60) 30.0 (39)
Note: Figures and percentage rounded to two decimal points and nearest percentage.
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TABLE 3 Results of Dunnett t-test (2-sided)
(I) Experiment Control group Mean difference Std. error Sig.
95% confidence interval
Lower bound Upper bound
Minimum price 4 € No reference price 1.188 1.048 .535 −1.306 3.681
Maximum price 15 € No reference price 3.539 1.032 .002 1.085 5.994
Suggested price 7 € No reference price −.439 1.032 .952 −2.894 2.015
Note: Dunnett t-tests treat one group as a control, and compare all other groups against it.
F IGURE 2 Distribution of paid price
by reference price strategy
TABLE 4 Results of post-hoc
Dunn–Bonferroni-test
Test statistics Std. error z-value Adj. Sig.
Suggested price 7 €– no reference price −1.273 9.086 −.140 1.000
Suggested price 7 €– minimum price 4 € −11.959 9.231 −1.295 1.000
Suggested price 7 €– maximum price 15 € −31.364 9.086 −3.452 .003
No reference price – minimum price 4 € 10.686 9.231 1.158 1.000
No reference price – maximum price 15 € 30.091 9.086 3.312 .006
Minimum price 4 €– maximum price 15 € −19.405 9.231 −2.102 .213
Note: Results of post hoc Dunn–Bonferroni-test. Each row tests the null hypothesis that the sample 1 and sample 2 distributions are the same. 2-sided test
with significance level of .05. Significant values have been adjusted by the Bonferroni correction.
TABLE 5 Results of independent-samples Levene test
TMD CTMD F t-value df Sig. MD Effect size
Minimum price D – control minimum D 3.40 3.32 .132 .116 62 .908 .085
Maximum price D – control maximum D 7.05 10.89 1.163 −3.906 64 .000 −3.842 .4
Suggested price D – control suggested price D 3.79 4.02 .226 −.313 64 .755 −.227
Abbreviations: CTMD, control treatment mean distance; D, distance; MD, mean difference; TMD, treatment mean distance.
Effect size: absolute value of the square root of the quotient of the squared t-value and the squared t-value plus the degree of freedom. Independent sam-
ple t-test: Levene's test for equality of variances, 2-tailed.
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Overall, comparing the detected significant distances in the maxi-
mum price setting in model 1 and 2, payments cluster more strongly
around IRP2 with a strong effect of .633 (Cohen, 1992) in comparison
to the effect of .337 around IRP1 (Table 7). This effect is also stronger
than the clustering of the prices paid around the externally provided
maximum price with .439 (Table 5).
5 | DISCUSSION AND MANAGERIAL
IMPLICATIONS
Since external reference prices are one driver for customers' pricing
choices (Burton et al., 2009) and research finds mixed results of
PWYW pricing strategy effects, the aim of this study is to analyze the
effects of different pricing strategies on the amount of money paid
within an arts nonprofit PWYW setting. We conducted a field experi-
ment at a German photo biennial, alternating the external reference
price in minimum, maximum, suggested, and no reference prices.
Based on the concepts of economic gain and downward pressure in
an interplay between internal and external reference prices, we
hypothesize that a minimum reference price will reduce the mean
payment of visitors.
The results of the experiment show a tendency that smaller num-
bers in the form of a minimum price and suggested price in an external
price setting lead to smaller amounts paid as an ethical “carte blanche”
for low payments (Jung et al., 2016). However, these values do not
differ significantly from a situation with no external reference price,
which matches the previous results that find no effects for an external
reference price provision on payment behavior (Johnson & Cui, 2013).
Investigating possible underlying pushing mechanisms, the clustering
of prices informs if the pricing behavior of visitors is motivated either
by external or internal reference prices. Providing a suggested price
decreases the variance of prices paid, which indicates an anchoring
effect, however, not significant. In a minimum price setting, no signifi-
cant anchoring effects occur. Only in the maximum price setting do
external numbers guide visitors' payment decisions.
Comparing the payment distribution with internal reference
prices as “internal compasses,” a more nuanced picture about payment
behavior emerges. In a setting where the external reference price is
smaller than the internal reference price—measured as the self-
reported price paid in a previous similar context (Bearden et al.,
1992)—economic gain drives payments closer to the external refer-
ence price and further away from the internal reference price. This
effect occurs for the minimum and suggested price settings. When
TABLE 6 Overview results of hypotheses testing
Hypothesis Test Result Decision
H1a) In a real purchasing setting, external reference pricing in the
form of a minimum price decreases the mean paid price.
Dunnett t-test (Table 3) Decrease of mean price paid but not
significantly different compared to
control group.
—
H1b) In a real purchasing setting, external reference pricing in the
form of a minimum price changes the distribution of the
paid prices causing the paid prices to cluster closer to the
minimum price.
Dunn–Bonferroni-test
(Table 4),
independent-samples
Levene test (Table 5)
No clustering around the minimum
price detected.
—
H2a) In a real purchasing setting, external reference pricing in the
form of a maximum price, decreases the mean paid price.
Dunnett t-test (Table 3) In the maximum price condition, the
mean price is significantly higher
than in the control setting.
—
H2b) In a real purchasing setting, external reference pricing in the
form of a maximum price changes the distribution of the
paid prices causing the paid prices to cluster closer to the
maximum price.
Dunn–Bonferroni-test
(Table 4),
independent-samples
Levene test (Table 5)
In the maximum price strategy
setting the paid price distance and
the maximum price distance
significantly decreases (p = .000),
indicating a significant clustering
closer to the maximum price.
✓
H3 In a real purchasing setting, external reference pricing in the
form of a suggested price changes the distribution of the
chosen prices causing the chosen prices to cluster closer to
the suggested price.
Dunn–Bonferroni-test
(Table 4),
independent-samples
Levene test (Table 5)
No clustering around the minimum
price detected.
—
Note: —, hypothesis not supported; ✓, hypothesis supported.
F IGURE 3 Example of calculating different distance measures
with IRP1 in case i for the maximum price setting
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visitors have shown a willingness to pay higher prices in the past than
the external reference price, they follow the lower external reference
price. Thus, in this particular PWYW scenario, the external reference
price functions as an anchor, and visitors pay less than they have done
previously and, thus, experience an economic gain by saving money.
Referring to upward pressure and loss aversion in a situation
where the external reference price exceeds the internal reference
price, a decreasing effect on the average price paid was hypothesized
for the presence of a maximum reference price. The results point in
the opposite direction. This is in line with previous findings that find a
significant effect of providing higher numbers as external prices on
the average amount paid (Armstrong Soule & Madrigal, 2015). Here,
an upward pressure closer to the external reference price increases
the average payment, indicating an anchoring function for this strate-
gic price setting. This trend could hint at underlying pro-social
motives, such as altruism or self-image, that drive payment decisions
(Gneezy et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2009). However, looking more closely
at the interplay between external and internal reference prices, this
assumed anchoring effect of the external reference price dissolves.
The internal reference price clustering is stronger than the maximum
reference price clustering. Thus, the results show that when the exter-
nal reference price exceeds the internal one, the latter functions as
the main anchor to guide the payment decisions of visitors
(Mazumdar et al., 2005; Roy et al., 2016). Although the general spend-
ing level is higher in the maximum price setting, the average amount
paid is still lower than the reported internal reference price. Thus, visi-
tors experience economic gain since, on average, they pay less than
they did for a similar service in the past. Moreover, the payment vol-
ume remains in the visitor's usual spending range of cultural goods.
The absence of extreme deviations from usual cultural spending
behavior denies implications about a heightened pro-social funding
behavior or donation awareness in a PWYW nonprofit arts context.
This indicates that visitors, when making pricing decisions, do not dif-
ferentiate between nonprofit arts organizations that rely on donations
or public arts institutions that are funded mainly through tax money.
This rationale allows to extend findings by Regner (2015) to assume
that reciprocal aspects override altruistic motives in purchase situa-
tion of nonprofit arts services.
Summing up, this experiment reveals that also in nonprofit arts
contexts, PWYW triggers economic considerations of loss aversion
and gain and that the internal reference price guides payment deci-
sions. In a setting where the external reference price is below the
internal one, the former functions as an anchor driven by economic
gain. Additionally, in a setting with an external reference price that is
higher than an internal reference price, the anchor point shifts to the
lower value, namely, the internal reference price. Although social
norms may increase the pressure to pay the external reference price,
loss aversion is a stronger driver (Gautier & van der Klaauw, 2012;
Tversky & Kahnemann, 1991).
Furthermore, placing the study's findings in a general discussion
about the economic outcome of PWYW, two conclusions can be
drawn. First, in contrast to previous studies, many visitors choose to
pay nothing (Gerpott, 2017). The tendency to pay zero may be due to
the study design as a field experiment in contrast to laboratory experi-
ments. This may also indicate that when confronted with the spending
of one's own real money, customers' behaviors may change towards a
stronger economic gain orientation. In addition, the high frequency of
nonpayers can be specific to the culture sector. For example, in Ger-
many, most museums provide free entry, indicating an acceptable
social norm to pay nothing (Institute for Museum Research, 2018).
The common practice of free entry to cultural programs may guide
visitors. Furthermore, the overall low funding volume generated in the
TABLE 7 Results of Paired Sample t-test on internal reference price distance (Model 1)
TMD TMID1 t-value df Sig MD Effect size
Minimum price D – minimum price IRP1 D 3.40 3.31 −1.270 30 .214 −.093
Maximum price D – maximum price IRP1 D 7.05 4.37 −2.028 32 .051 −2.686 .337
Suggested price D – suggested price IRP1 D 3.79 3.15 −1.620 32 .115 −.639
Note: Effect size: absolute value of the square root of the quotient of the squared t-value and the squared t-value plus the degree of freedom. Paired sam-
ple t-Test, 2-tailed.
Abbreviations: D, Distance; IRP1, internal reference price1 (control mean); MD, mean difference; TMD, treatment mean distance; TMID, treatment mean
internal reference price1 distance.
TABLE 8 Results of paired sample t-test on internal reference price distance (Model 2)
TMD TMID2 t-value df Sig MD Effect size
Minimum price D – minimum price IRP2 D 3.40 4.99 1.905 30 .066 1.584 .329
Maximum price D – maximum price IRP2 D 7.05 3.85 −4.623 32 .000 −3.198 .633
Suggested price D – suggested price IRP2 D 3.79 5.95 6.487 32 .000 2.167 .754
Note: Effect size: absolute value of the square root of the quotient of the squared t-value and the squared t-value plus the degree of freedom. Paired sam-
ple t-test, 2-tailed.
Abbreviations: D, Distance; MD, mean difference; IRP2, Internal reference price2 (mean self-reported IRP from control); TMD, Treatment mean distance;
TMID2, Treatment mean internal reference price2 distance.
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PWYW scheme could result from crowding out effects of private phi-
lanthropy due to large government funding activities in the arts and
culture sector. On the one hand, relying mainly on government sup-
port, arts nonprofit organizations in Germany may appear as public
institutions, which are financially supported by individuals through
mandatory tax fees but rarely through additional donations (Brooks,
2000). On the other hand, if an arts program appears as niche it may
signal the need of public or corporate support since traditional market
demand will not suffice. Thus, this situation evokes free-rider effects
and induces low self-efficacy for the individual, both incentives to pay
no or little money for “public” services.
Second, the overall mean price paid (Table 2) for each treatment
but the maximum pricing strategy setting is below the standard mar-
ket price of 7 euros, defined as the fixed entry fee for that particular
museum venue where the field experiment took place. The visitors'
average payment below the standard market price level matches gen-
eral findings in the PWYW research field on economic outputs
(Gerpott, 2017).
These results lead to managerial implications for nonprofit (cul-
tural) organizations. First, using PWYW as payment mechanism, man-
agers should decide on project calculations and pricing strategies
against the background of paid prices below the standard market price
level. Second, to avoid a potential revenue gap, the results of this
experiment indicate that setting an external reference price above a
general internal reference price may activate a pull effect, increasing
overall prices paid. To increase net benefits, nonprofit (arts) organiza-
tions should, beforehand, identify the internal reference price level of
its customers. When the distance between the internal and external
reference price is sufficiently large, upward pressure influences the
payment decisions and increases payment. Third, in cultural contexts,
cost structures are nontransparent, and the quality and value of intan-
gible arts products is difficult to assess. Thus, for this missing informa-
tion, providing visitors with an external reference price can function
as orientation point for payment decisions.
6 | LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study is one of the first experiments that shows that PWYW pric-
ing strategies in nonprofit organizations have different effects than in
a for-profit context and, therefore, contributes to the recent scientific
debate on sector differences in PWYW (Johnson & Cui, 2013). How-
ever, future research on different nonprofit services applying PWYW
should validate our results to overcome some of the following limita-
tions. Methodically, this field experiment overcomes disadvantages
from laboratory experiments; yet, the data collection had its limita-
tions. Visitors of the biennial stated their monetary contribution in the
questionnaire, which may be affected by a social desirability bias and
lead to a discrepancy between real prices paid and the report of prices
paid. As a remedy for this shortcoming, the biennial provided, weekly,
the number of visitors and the sum of revenues. A quota of the actual
price paid per visitor could be calculated and compared to the average
amount paid reported by the survey participants. Comparing for each
treatment, the average payments for the real and reported prices paid,
the results are similar. Only in the setting of the suggested price was
the real average price paid higher (in second place) compared to the
self-reported mean (fourth place). Thus, the results of the suggested
price need to be interpreted with caution as the self-reported prices
paid may be overestimated (Jung et al., 2016). Furthermore, in the
experimental design, the anchoring values lay close together. To iso-
late and compare the effects of internal and external reference prices
on prices paid, future research should use increased distance between
reference prices.
Another methodological shortcoming is the lack of additional
behavioral data of the visitors—qualitative and quantitative—which
would have been useful to explain individual psychological aspects
when facing payment decision in a pro-social context and to provide
an in-depth understanding of unexpected results. Future PWYW stud-
ies can profit from implementing a mixed-method approach (Creswell,
2014) to overcome these limitations by combining survey data with
on-site observations and interviews.
Furthermore, this study's main focus is to analyze effects of dif-
ferent PWYW pricing strategies within a nonprofit arts setting. To
enrich an understanding for different pressure mechanisms, particu-
larly in the nonprofit context, future research should investigate addi-
tional social mechanisms, such as social norms, social identity, and
social orientation as well as general pro-social behavior like
volunteering simultaneously with economic gain aspects. Researchers
should further conduct cross-national comparative studies on PWYW
to capture differences of culture and social norms regarding general
paying and donation behaviors. Replicating this study in other coun-
tries with different funding structures of the arts sector would allow a
more nuanced picture of possible crowding out effects of government
spending, corporation, and private philanthropy on individual pro-
social behavior in exchange relationships with nonprofit and public
(arts) organizations (Brooks, 2000).
Moreover, no statement can be made about whether the underly-
ing scaling effect of PWYW on the overall revenue generation has
taken place. For such an assessment, data on the number of visitors in
a PWYW setting and a fixed-price setting and overall revenues are
needed. Future research designs should include measures to capture
these potential scaling effects in a field experiment.
Finally, PWYW can possibly lower financial entry boundaries and
reach low-income citizens as a target audience for the cultural product
or services. Thus, for the debate in the nonprofit context, a potential
impact on the social mission fulfillment might occur. PWYW may be a
suitable marketing strategy for nonprofit (arts) organizations to
increase and diversify their audiences in line with their educational
missions. This seems to be a very promising new research area in line
with participative and democratizing decision-making processes and
behaviors.
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ENDNOTE
1The correlation coefficient is calculated as the absolute value of the quo-
tient of the z-value and square root of the sample size, n, of the compared
groups.
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